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ARGUMENT
Point IA. Preservation was created when the issue was raised at trial
in the evidence and in the Defense's opening statement. Defense Counsel
included the defendant's living condition at trial as part of the totality of the
circumstances when determining if the Defendant was in actual physical
possession of the vehicle. R. 146 Lines 9-16. Counsel continued to reiterate
this issue throughout her questions and by the manner of presentation at trial.
Counsel's failure to bring up the issue during her closing statement was a
direct result of her need to address evidence that was entered that should
have been suppressed, namely any statement to the effect that the Defendant
drove to the store.
Point IB. Further, the legal authority behind this rule is not based
specifically on intent to use the vehicle as a dwelling.. .there is no such
holding in either direction that I was able to find. The legal basis of this
claim is that the totality of the circumstances determine the element of actual
physical control of the vehicle. Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, at 93
(Ut. App. 1990). In fact, the two cases relied upon in Appellant's brief,
State v. Barnhart, 850 P.2d 473 (Ut. App. 1993) and Walker, indicate that
there could be some use to the intent of the driver.

Further, while the

defendant's intention as to his ultimate destination has not been considered
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definitive, the logic of the court's ruling would include circumstances that
affect the circumstances to the point that the defendant's sleeping in a
vehicle, because it was his home, fit in the totality of the circumstances.
True, there is evidence that may indicate that the defendant was in
actual physical control of the vehicle, however, given that the defendant is
the only one in the line of cases cited who has actively lived out of his
vehicle and been found intoxicated therein, it seems clear that this court has
never had to determine whether such additional information could tilt the
scales towards a finding that the defendant did not have actual physical
control of the vehicle.
Further, the nature of evidence admitted as to the defendant driving
the vehicle, especially as it was tainted in closing arguments with the
objection of the State while defense counsel pointed out the deficiencies of
State's evidence provided the jury with a method of finding that the
defendant had driven the vehicle, without adequate evidence, and allowed
them to make a finding not consistent with actual physical control, justifying
a remand of this case to retry the issue without the tainted evidence.
Point IC. Finally, the State's claim that the Defendant fully intended
to exercise his option to return to the yard appears to ignore the statements
made directly by the Defendant and mischaracterizes his testimony. The
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State relies on the Defendant's direct testimony where he stated, "I want to
kick back at the house, relax, watch some videos, eat dinner and, you know
stuff like that." R. 182 Lines 7-9. While this statement alone appears to
infer an intent to return home, the defendant clarified that when his associate
Curtis, who had driven him to the store parking lot, indicated that he wanted
to go out drinking, the defendant testified, "I was like, I don't have nowhere
to go, nowhere to drive, I knew better, not to drive, so, I stayed in my car.
My car was my home." R. 182 Lines 10-12. The defendant's testimony
reaffirmed his intent to use his vehicle as his home and his willingness to
remain at any location, whether in the yard, at the "pusher's" home, or
wherever his car was located.
Defense requests that the court to rule that when an individual's sole
abode is their vehicle, that such an individual would not be able to be in
actual physical control of a vehicle for purposes of Utah's law regarding
Driving Under the Influence. However, the Defense understands that the
issue was unable to receive fair representation at the trial level due to trial
counsel's failure to prevent the admission of evidence. Therefore, Defense's
alternative request is for an opportunity for the issue to be heard at the
District Court and for this court to remand the issue to the Eighth Judicial
District to be able to address this issue.
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The defense presented the argument of intent to remain in the vehicle,
but did so without proper appeal or intention, thereby preventing the
Defendant from obtaining valid defense levels. Without that assistance,
Defendant was prejudiced from obtaining a thorough and full hearted
defense as would be necessary for the defendant to obtain a fair trial.
Point 2A. Defendant adequately presented a valid ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, which was replete with Prejudice, which could
only been avoided had Trial Counsel's assistance been effective.
The statement is clearly hearsay under Utah Rules of Evidence 801.
Appellant counsel should not be obligated to anticipate all situations under
which hearsay would be admissible for a claim of inadmissible hearsay to be
established. Appellee's claim for a nonhearsay justification for the evidence
to be entered is not supported. Under State v. Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38,
*P6 this court reasoned that evidence could only be deemed not hearsay if it
was unfairly prejudicial, "meaning it has an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional
one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror." quoting
Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84,17, 158 P.3d 552 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In this case, the arguments presented in the initial brief are
such that they infer actual driving by a defendant of a vehicle while
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intoxicated, allowing a jury to infer guilt of that rule, without application to
the evidence. In spite of a failure to cite significant legal authority, the
argument presented developed a clear enough basis for appellee to present
argument against those charges.
Point 2B. Furthermore, as the case law presented by the State shows,
a jury instruction may provide grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel
if the. "jury was confused or misled by the instruction." United States v.
Valencia, 907 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1990). Further, the objection provided
under State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, is not applicable in this case. In
Malaga the jury instruction objected to had no supporting evidence to supply
a jury's foundation to apply the conviction, Malaga at 115-16, there the
defendant was being charged as a principal, and the alternate language
regarding accomplice liability was not applicable to his situation. With our
case, however, we find that objectionable hearsay was provided to the jury's
ears without objection, argument was made in closing argument, which was
objected to, highlighting the error, and a jury instruction was included the
elements of the crime for which the objectionably admitted evidence would
have been intended to establish. The real danger of this ineffective
assistance of counsel is that by being forced to focus on evidence supplied,
which would have properly been omitted from the record, trial counsel was
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unable to effectively argue those positions which would have supported
overturning the conviction, thus allowing for the alternate outcome.
CONCLUSION
The failure of counsel, coupled with the errors of testimony and
evidence submitted to the court, along with an unsuccessful attempt to bring
a significant issue before the trial court, which prevented the jury from
having being enabled to make a fair declaration.
Therefore, this case should be dismissed. The reasons for this are the
lack of evidence that Appellant actual drove the vehicle and that there is
substantial evidence that the Defendant's abode was his car within the
parking lot of the store, which, given the totality of the circumstances should
show that the Defendant was not in actual physical control of the vehicle.
In the alternative, because the trial court/jury was hampered in their
ability to reach a valid determination due to prejudicial information reaching
the jury, the case should be remanded to the District Court and a new trial
ordered.
Dated this 12th day of May, 2011.
Brett M. Kraus

Attorney for the Appellant
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